# A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem

*Preprint published on the PhilSci archive.*

I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the hyper-entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the hyper-entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the hyper-entanglement urn have ontologically different properties from normal ones. In this context, drawing a red ball (a Monday-waking) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability, depending on whether one considers “balls-as-colour” or “balls-as-object”. This leads to a two-sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem.

This account supersides my previous preprints on this topic. Please do no cite previous work.

# Elements of Dialectical Contextualism

*Posprint in English (with additional illustrations) of an article appeared in French in the collective book (pages 581-608) written on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Pascal Engel.*

**Abstract** In what follows, I strive to present the elements of a philosophical doctrine, which can be defined as *dialectical contextualism*. I proceed first to define the elements of this doctrine: dualities and polar contraries, the principle of dialectical indifference and the one-sidedness bias. I emphasize then the special importance of this doctrine in one specific field of meta-philosophy: the methodology for solving philosophical paradoxes. Finally, I describe several applications of this methodology on the following paradoxes: Hempel’s paradox, the surprise examination paradox and the Doomsday Argument.

# A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

*A paper published (2009) in English in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 34, pages 263-278 (with significant changes with regard to the preprint).*

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast with, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Doomsday argument. I argue then that the resulting two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.

# A Solution to Goodman’s Paradox

*English Posprint (with additional illustrations) of a paper published in French in Dialogue Vol. 40, Winter 2001, pp. 99-123 under the title “Une Solution pour le Paradoxe de Goodman”.*

In the classical version of Goodman’s paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of *n*-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given *n*-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in an *n*-universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an *n*-universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution.

# A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

*English translation of a paper appeared in French in Philosophiques 2005, vol. 32, pages 399-421 (with minor changes with regard to the published version).*

This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution and Hall’s reduction apply to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the version of the paradox based on the disjoint structure.

# Probabilistic Situations for Goodmanian N-universes

*A paper appeared (2006) in French in the Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 31, pages 123-141, under the title “Situations probabilistes pour n-univers goodmaniens.”*

I proceed to describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe first how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modelling of complex probabilistic situations and fits more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds.

# The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem : a Dialectical Contextualism Analysis

English postprint of a paper initially published in French in Philosophiques, 2016, 43-2, pp. 371-389, under the title *L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique*

ABSTRACT. I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation Argument from a dialectical contextualist’s standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing in detail Bostrom’s Simulation Argument. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation Argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to three different reference classes: aware-simulations, imperfect simulations and immersion-simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature.

# A Solution to the Doomsday Argument

An article published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy Volume 28, July1998, pages 227-46.

This article presents a solution for the Doomsday Argument (DA). First, I show that there is no objective criterion for choosing a reference class in general: in that case, the calculation inherent in DA cannot take place. Secondly, I consider the particular choice of a given reference class, as Leslie recommends. But the arbitrary nature of selection makes it legitimate to make multiple choices, either by extension or by restriction: DA can then be established in particular for the genus Homo, for the species Homo sapiens, for the subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens, … , for a narrowly defined class corresponding to humans who have not known computers, and so on. Finally, it appears that DA ‘works’, but its conclusion is harmless.

# The Doomsday Argument and Hempel’s Problem

*Posprint in English (with additional illustrations from wikimedia commons) of a paper published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol.29, July 1999, pp. 139-56 under the title “Comment l’Urne de Carter et Leslie se Déverse dans celle de Hempel”.*

I begin by describing a solution to Hempel’s Problem. I recall, second, the solution to the Doomsday Argument described in my previous Une Solution pour l’Argument de l’Apocalypse (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1998-2) and remark that both solutions are based on a similar line of reasoning. I show thirdly that the Doomsday Argument can be reduced to the core of Hempel’s Problem.