Tag Archives: monistic dualism

Matrix of concepts

The structure of a matrix of concepts

The matrix of concepts is a structure that includes six concepts, which is suitable for modeling many common concepts, such as: courage, recklessness, irresolution, eclecticism, superficiality, clemency, instability, selfishness, objectivity, frankness, brusqueness, altruism, etc. Of the six concepts in the matrix:

  • two are neutral: A0 and Ā0
  • two are positive: A+ and Ā+
  • two are negative: A and Ā

These six concepts constitute the canonical poles of the matrix.

The six concepts of the matrix are in particular relationships with each other. Thus:

  • the neutral concepts A0 and Ā0 are dual
  • the positive concept A+ and the negative concept Ā are opposite (or contrary); similarly, the negative concept A and the positive concept Ā+ are opposite (or contrary)
  • the positive concepts A+ and Ā+ are complementary
  • lastly, the negative concepts A and Ā are extreme opposites
An instance of matrix of concepts

In the above instance of matrix of concepts:

  • the propensity to take risks and the propensity to avoid risks are dual
  • audacity and cowardice are contrary, opposite; in the same way, temerity and prudence are contrary, opposite
  • audacity and prudence are complementary
  • temerity and cowardice are extreme opposites

Moreover, the three concepts located on the left of the matrix constitute a half-matrix: it is the half-matrix associated with the pole A. In the same way, the three concepts located on the right of the matrix constitute the half-matrix associated to the pole Ā.


Franceschi, P., “Une classe de concepts” (in english), Semiotica, vol. 139 (1-4), 2002, pages 211-226.


Ambiguous images Arbitrary focus Bistable perception Complementarity relationship Conflict resolution Conflict resolution with matrices of concepts Conflict types relating to matrices of concepts Contrary relationship Courage Dialectical contextualism Dialectical monism Dialectical monism in Aztec philosophy Dialectical monism in Heraclitus Dichotomic analysis Dichotomic analysis applied to paradox resolution Dichotomous reasoning Disqualification of one pole Disqualification of the positive Doctrine of the mean Doomsday argument Dualities Dual poles Extreme opposition General cognitive distortions Instance of one-sidedness bias Liar paradox Matrix of concepts Maximization Mental filter Minimization Bistable cognition Omission of the neutral One-sidedness bias One-sided viewpoint Opposition relationship Principle of dialectical indifference Requalification into the other pole Reference class Reference class problem Reference class problem in philosophical paradoxes Reference class problem in the Doomsday argument Reference class problem in Hempel’s paradox Reference class problem in the surprise examination paradox Selective abstraction Sorites paradox Specific cognitive distortions Surprise examination paradox System of taxa Two-sided viewpoint Viewpoint of a duality Viewpoint of a pole




Dialectical monism

Dialectical monism is a philosophical doctrine that tends to consider that objects present an intrinsic unity, which results from the union of the dual poles that characterize them. The difference with monism in general lies in the fact that unity results in dialectical monism, from the union of the dual or opposite poles which are inherent to the objects.

In the ancient Aztec philosophy, we find a form of dialectical monism.

In the same way, a form of dialectical monism is present in the thought of Heraclitus.


Ambiguous images Arbitrary focus Bistable perception Complementarity relationship Conflict resolution Conflict resolution with matrices of concepts Conflict types relating to matrices of concepts Contrary relationship Courage Dialectical contextualism Dialectical monism Dialectical monism in Aztec philosophy Dialectical monism in Heraclitus Dichotomic analysis Dichotomic analysis applied to paradox resolution Dichotomous reasoning Disqualification of one pole Disqualification of the positive Doctrine of the mean Doomsday argument Dualities Dual poles Extreme opposition General cognitive distortions Instance of one-sidedness bias Liar paradox Matrix of concepts Maximization Mental filter Minimization Bistable cognition Omission of the neutral One-sidedness bias One-sided viewpoint Opposition relationship Principle of dialectical indifference Requalification into the other pole Reference class Reference class problem Reference class problem in philosophical paradoxes Reference class problem in the Doomsday argument Reference class problem in Hempel’s paradox Reference class problem in the surprise examination paradox Selective abstraction Sorites paradox Specific cognitive distortions Surprise examination paradox System of taxa Two-sided viewpoint Viewpoint of a duality Viewpoint of a pole