The one-sided bias consists in focusing on a given standpoint when considering a given object, and of neglecting the opposite view. In our framework, such fallacious reasoning consists, when considering an object o and the reference class associated with it, of taking into account the viewpoint of the A pole (respectively Ā), while completely ignoring the viewpoint corresponding to its dual pole Ā (respectively A) to define the reference class. We shall term one-sidedness bias such type of fallacy.
The conditions of this type of bias, in violation of the principle of dialectical indifference, needs however to be clarified. Indeed, in this context, we can consider that there are some cases where the two-sidedness with respect to a given duality A/Ā is not required. Such is the case when the elements of the context do not presuppose conditions of objectivity and exhaustiveness of views. Thus, a lawyer who would only emphasise the evidence in defence of his/her client, while completely ignoring the evidence against him/her does not commit the above-mentioned type of error of reasoning. In such a circumstance, in fact, the lawyer would not commit a faulty one-sidedness bias, since it is his/her inherent role. The same would go in a trial for the prosecutor, who conversely, would only focus on the evidence against the same person, by completely ignoring the exculpatory elements. In such a situation also the resulting one-sidedeness bias would not be inappropriate, because it follows well from the context that it consists well of the limited role assigned to the prosecutor. By contrast, a judge who would only take into account the evidence against the accused, or who would commit the opposite error, namely of only considering the exculpatory against the latter, would well commit an inappropriate one-sidedness bias because the mere role of the judge implies that he/she takes into account the two types of elements, and that his/her judgement is the result of the synthesis which is made.

Franceschi, P., “Une classe de concepts” (in english), Semiotica, vol. 139 (1-4), 2002, pages 211-226.

Franceschi, P., “Éléments d’un contextualisme dialectique” (in english), in Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, J. Dutant, G. Fassio & A. Meylan (éd.), Université de Genève, 2014, p. 581-608.

Ambiguous images ▣ Arbitrary focus ▣ Bistable perception ▣ Complementarity relationship ▣ Conflict resolution ▣ Conflict resolution with matrices of concepts ▣ Conflict types relating to matrices of concepts ▣ Contrary relationship ▣ Courage ▣ Dialectical contextualism ▣ Dialectical monism ▣ Dialectical monism in Aztec philosophy ▣ Dialectical monism in Heraclitus ▣ Dichotomic analysis ▣ Dichotomic analysis applied to paradox resolution ▣ Dichotomous reasoning ▣ Disqualification of one pole ▣ Disqualification of the positive ▣ Doctrine of the mean ▣ Doomsday argument ▣ Dualities ▣ Dual poles ▣ Extreme opposition ▣ General cognitive distortions ▣ Instance of one-sidedness bias ▣ Liar paradox ▣ Matrix of concepts ▣ Maximization ▣ Mental filter ▣ Minimization ▣ Bistable cognition ▣ Omission of the neutral ▣ One-sidedness bias ▣ One-sided viewpoint ▣ Opposition relationship ▣ Principle of dialectical indifference ▣ Requalification into the other pole ▣ Reference class ▣ Reference class problem ▣ Reference class problem in philosophical paradoxes ▣ Reference class problem in the Doomsday argument ▣ Reference class problem in Hempel’s paradox ▣ Reference class problem in the surprise examination paradox ▣ Selective abstraction ▣ Sorites paradox ▣ Specific cognitive distortions ▣ Surprise examination paradox ▣ System of taxa ▣ Two-sided viewpoint ▣ Viewpoint of a duality ▣ Viewpoint of a pole